msaRAT, a backdoor used by the Chaos ransomware group, hides its command channel inside a headless Chrome or Edge browser. Instead of calling an attacker server, it relays everything through Cloudflare Workers and Twilio TURN, so security tools see a trusted browser talking to trusted clouds. Catching it means watching behavior, not destinations.
What Is msaRAT?
The backdoor is written in Rust on the Tokio runtime, and its name comes from the msaOpen, msaClose, msaError and msaMessage bindings it registers inside the browser. Security researchers published their analysis on July 23, 2026, and tied it to Chaos, a ransomware as a service group first confirmed in February 2025. Chaos rarely lists victims on its leak site, yet it consistently targets large organizations and uses double extortion.
How Does the Backdoor Get In?
The intrusions start with people, not exploits. First, Chaos operators use spam email or voice phishing to gain a foothold, then abuse remote monitoring and management tools for persistence. Next, before deploying ransomware, they run curl to pull an MSI called update_ms.msi from 172.86.126.18 over plain HTTP on port 443, saving it to C:\ProgramData. When that installer finishes, a custom action loads lib.dll, the msaRAT payload, straight into memory, so no standalone executable ever lands on disk.
How Does the Backdoor Turn the Browser Into a C2 Channel?
Notably, the backdoor never touches the internet itself. Instead, it finds Chrome or Edge, launches the browser headless with remote debugging enabled, and connects over Chrome DevTools Protocol (CDP). Then it disables the page Content Security Policy and injects JavaScript that builds a WebRTC data channel. The browser fetches its relay settings from a Cloudflare Workers endpoint, using a HeadlessChrome user agent with Origin and Referer spoofed to look like Microsoft. Finally, the attacker’s answer carries no direct connection candidates, which forces every byte through Twilio TURN.
As a result, the backdoor process only ever talks to 127.0.0.1, while all outside traffic appears to come from the browser. This is a textbook case of bidirectional communication over a legitimate web service, combined with hidden infrastructure, because the attacker’s real server never shows up in endpoint traffic.
Why Does Encryption Make Inspection Useless?
The channel wears two layers of encryption. WebRTC wraps the data channel in DTLS automatically, and the backdoor adds its own ChaCha20-Poly1305 layer keyed through an ECDH exchange before data even reaches the browser. Therefore, SSL inspection and deep packet inspection cannot read the commands. In addition, msaRAT organizes its traffic into frames that handle the key exchange, channel state and data, and the full command set sits in tables in the original research.
What Did Researchers Confirm, and What Is Overstated?
However, many write ups go further than the evidence. The table below separates what the original analysis shows from what it only suggests.
| Claim | Status |
|---|---|
| Headless browser driven over CDP, CSP disabled, JavaScript injected | Confirmed in the analysis |
| Signaling via a Cloudflare Workers endpoint, relay via Twilio TURN | Confirmed in the analysis |
| Direct connections blocked so all traffic uses TURN | Inferred from the attacker’s response, a fair reading |
| DTLS plus ChaCha20-Poly1305 with ECDH | Confirmed in the analysis |
| Uses debugging port 9222 | Not published; 9222 is only Chrome’s default |
| Registry fallback for finding the browser | Chrome only, not Edge |
| Cloudflare chosen to slip past allowlists | Researchers’ speculation |
| Chaos used as an Iranian espionage decoy | Not in the original analysis; separate, unconfirmed claim |
Thailand’s national CERT also issued an advisory on msaRAT that summarizes the same chain for defenders.
Which Indicators Should You Load Now?
Load the published indicators into your SIEM and EDR, and block the signaling domain outright. Because Twilio TURN and workers.dev serve real businesses, log and baseline them rather than blocking them wholesale.
How Do You Detect the Chain?
No single event proves an infection, because Chrome, WebRTC, Cloudflare and Twilio are all normal. However, the full sequence is not. Build correlation rules around these steps, and treat the chain as a high confidence signal.
- Watch the installer: alert when curl.exe writes an MSI into C:\ProgramData, and when an MSI custom action loads a DLL into memory
- Watch browser launches: flag Chrome or Edge started headless with a remote debugging port, especially from an unusual parent process
- Watch CDP: look for local HTTP requests to /json/list/ and unexpected debugging listeners on finance, HR, executive and helpdesk machines
- Watch the clouds: review workers.dev requests and Twilio TURN traffic that come from headless browsers or endpoints that never use real time apps
- Inventory automation: record where headless browsers are legitimate, such as QA and CI/CD hosts, and alert everywhere else
- Scan memory: rely on EDR memory scanning and process lineage, because file scanning will miss an in memory DLL
What Does This Mean for Your Security Program?
In short, the lesson reaches past one backdoor. Attackers increasingly live off trusted tools, whether that is a browser, a cloud relay or an AI generated script like the one in our analysis of an AI PowerShell Active Directory attack. Our 2026 Mid Year Threat Pattern Report already counted msaRAT’s browser based C2 among the year’s unique tools that no signature database held. Above all, detection has to follow behavior and process lineage, because destination reputation looks clean.
Our team runs penetration testing and vulnerability assessments that test whether your EDR and SIEM would catch a browser based C2 chain like this one, and our PTaaS platform keeps that testing continuous as attackers change tools.
Key Takeaways
- msaRAT is a Rust backdoor tied to Chaos ransomware that hides its C2 inside a headless Chrome or Edge browser
- It signals through Cloudflare Workers and relays through Twilio TURN, so the attacker’s server never appears
- Intrusions start with email or voice phishing and a fake update MSI that loads the backdoor into memory
- Port 9222, the Iranian decoy link and the allowlist theory are not confirmed by the original analysis
- Detect the chain: MSI to memory DLL, headless browser with remote debugging, /json/list/ requests, and unusual workers.dev or TURN traffic
Frequently Asked Questions About msaRAT
What is msaRAT?
msaRAT is a Rust backdoor tied to the Chaos ransomware group. It routes its command channel through a headless Chrome or Edge browser, so network tools see browser traffic instead of a malware process.
How does the backdoor use Chrome or Edge?
It launches the browser headless with remote debugging enabled, connects over Chrome DevTools Protocol, disables the page Content Security Policy, and injects JavaScript that builds a WebRTC data channel.
Why can’t defenders just block the C2 server?
The attacker’s server never appears. Signaling runs through Cloudflare Workers and data relays through Twilio TURN, both legitimate services that most enterprises cannot block outright.
How does msaRAT get onto a machine?
Recent Chaos intrusions began with spam email or voice phishing. The attackers later used curl to download an MSI posing as a Windows update, which loads the backdoor DLL directly into memory.
Is Chaos ransomware linked to Iranian espionage?
The original analysis does not say so. Separate reporting has claimed Iranian actors used the Chaos brand as cover, so treat that as unconfirmed while still checking any Chaos incident for data theft.
What should security teams monitor?
Watch for MSI installs that load DLLs into memory, headless browsers with remote debugging enabled, local requests to /json/list/, workers.dev traffic from headless browsers, and TURN traffic from endpoints that never use real time apps.

